How Israel used legacy tech for Electronic Warfare

The attack leveraged tampered pager tech, blending human intelligence with electronic warfare to enable kinetic use of Hezbollah’s communication radio devices.

In a covert operation that surprised military experts worldwide, Israel executed one of the most sophisticated retaliatory strikes in recent history. On 18 September 2024, approximately 5,000 pagers carried by senior and mid-level Hezbollah officials detonated simultaneously across Beirut, causing widespread casualties and confusion. This attack, following Hezbollah’s missile strikes on Northern Israel, highlights a pivotal moment in the ongoing conflict.

The attack, code-named Below the Belt, resulted from a carefully planned strategy combining open-source intelligence, human intelligence, and electronic warfare.

But how did this happen? And, more importantly, what made the strike so effective?

Beyond Simple Retaliation: A Strategic Approach

This offensive was not simply a reaction to Hezbollah’s missile attack. It was the result of a meticulously planned operation, combining Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Electronic Warfare (EW), executed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad.

To understand the brilliance of the operation, it is crucial to look at Hezbollah’s shift from modern mobile communications to older pager systems. Believed to be impervious to modern cyberattacks, pagers became the primary means for Hezbollah’s leadership to relay strategic information. However, this reliance on older technology—likely influenced by Mossad moles—became a vulnerability that Israel exploited.

Technology Overview: Legacy and Modern Devices

Pager devices, commonly known as beepers, were small telecommunication devices widely used before the proliferation of mobile phones, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. They were designed to send short messages or alerts and were often worn on the waist belt for convenience.

Upon receiving a message, the pager would emit a beep, vibrate, or play a tone, alerting the user to check for the new communication. These devices use analogue modulation techniques to operate on Very High-Frequency (VHF) and Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) radio bands.

The major advantage of analogue modulation is its robustness in noisy environments, allowing pager devices to cover large areas with a single transmitting tower. Messages could penetrate deep into buildings and underground bunkers, ensuring reliable communication in hard-to-reach locations. Furthermore, pagers are non-IP-based devices, making them immune to cyberattacks. The absence of GPS capabilities meant that user locations could not be traced, providing an added layer of security.

In contrast, mobile handsets, which became prevalent with digital technology, use digital modulation techniques in the UHF bands. These handsets offer much higher data transfer rates, allowing users to send data files, images, and videos. However, their coverage is more limited, as their performance depends on proximity to nearby cellular towers.

While SMS messages in mobile handsets are also digital, they can support longer message lengths than pagers. However, their delivery is highly dependent on the signal strength from nearby towers, making them unreliable in areas with poor coverage, such as deep inside buildings or bunkers.

The ability to remotely detonate pagers using a pre-arranged signal from Hezbollah’s paging network demonstrates Israel’s mastery of electronic warfare techniques.

Modern mobile handsets, particularly those using LTE and 5G technology, are IP-based devices, making them vulnerable to various forms of cyberattacks. Additionally, since these handsets are equipped with GPS chips, users’ precise location can be easily traced, introducing another layer of vulnerability in sensitive operations. The table Pagers Vs. Mobile Handsets illustrates how the technology excelled in geographic coverage and reliability, particularly in remote areas and emergencies.

Yet, it was this reliance on pagers that became Hezbollah’s undoing when Mossad turned the devices into weapons against them.

The Pager Trap: Turning Technology Against Itself

Capitalising on Hezbollah’s choice of pagers, Mossad orchestrated the procurement of 5,000 pager units from a Taiwanese OEM via a European distributor. En route, these devices were tampered with, and each was fitted with a small explosive device amalgamated with the original battery connected to an untraceable detonator. The trigger was a “specific message” sent through Hezbollah’s compromised Central Paging Control Station, leading to the simultaneous detonation of the pagers.

The decision to use legacy communication technology backfired for Hezbollah, as the devices they relied on for secure communication became their Achilles’ heel.

The Anatomy of the Attack: Years in the Making

The operation, code-named ‘Below the Belt’, relied on years of strategic infiltration. Mossad operatives had slowly gained Hezbollah’s trust by providing them with seemingly sound advice on avoiding modern surveillance techniques, such as using mobile phones. They promoted the idea that using low-tech, legacy communication devices like pagers would ensure operational security.

By effecting the kinetic use of electronic devices, Israel applied psychological warfare, eroding Hezbollah’s trust in its own tech and disrupting their ranks.

The pagers were delivered without raising any suspicion, with IDF and Mossad enabling their penetration into the rank and file of Hezbollah. For months, Hezbollah operatives used these devices, oblivious to the fact that they had been compromised. Then, at a moment of Israel’s choosing, a signal was sent through Hezbollah’s compromised central paging control station on 7 October 2024. This signal triggered the detonation of all 5,000 pagers simultaneously, causing significant casualties and sending shockwaves through Hezbollah’s ranks.

The psychological effects of the operation were significant. The use of pagers, a communication tool believed to be secure, caused disruption and operational confusion within Hezbollah’s leadership.

A Blend of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

What makes this attack stand out is its destructive power and its precision. The IDF and Mossad did not rely just on brute force; they combined three key strategies, HUMINT, OSINT, and EW, to deliver a highly coordinated strike.

#1

Human Intelligence: Mossad’s deep infiltration within Hezbollah was the key to the operation. They ensured that Hezbollah would purchase the compromised devices by influencing the group’s procurement decisions.

#2

Open-Source Intelligence: Israel could pinpoint the ideal strike moment by closely monitoring Hezbollah’s public activities and communication patterns.

#3

Electronic Warfare: The ability to remotely detonate the pagers using a pre-arranged signal from Hezbollah’s paging network demonstrated Israel’s mastery of electronic warfare techniques.

In addition to the pager detonations, Israel reportedly used similar EW techniques to sabotage other electronic devices in the kinetic form used by Hezbollah, including walkie-talkies and solar panels. These devices were also tampered with in transit and later detonated remotely, further increasing the psychological pressure on Hezbollah operatives.

Reports of widespread explosions in communication devices across Lebanon created a pervasive fear of electronic equipment, collapsing Hezbollah’s operational capabilities.

Disrupting Hezbollah’s Communication Strategy

For Hezbollah, the attack was a harsh lesson in the dangers of underestimating an adversary’s ability to exploit any vulnerability, no matter how small. Hezbollah’s reliance on pagers, once viewed as a security advantage, ultimately became a fatal flaw. The operation demonstrates how a combination of low-tech solutions and high-tech sabotage can significantly disrupt communication networks in modern conflicts.

While mobile phones and modern communication systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks, pagers were believed to offer protection due to their non-IP-based nature. However, as Israel’s attack demonstrated, any technology can be compromised if the attacker has sufficient access, intelligence, and strategic planning.

The ripple effect of the attack extended beyond just physical destruction. By targeting electronic devices, Israel introduced a new layer of psychological warfare, one that eroded Hezbollah’s trust in its own technology and created an atmosphere of paranoia within the group.

Electronic Warfare Back in the Game

EW has been highly effective throughout the history of warfare. The pager attack on Hezbollah highlights its continued importance and impact on the success of military offensives in future conflicts, where the ability to combine electronic and psychological warfare will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of military operations. The success of the pager operation relied not only on its execution but on its careful orchestration over months, if not years. It demonstrated how patience, intelligence gathering, and technological expertise can converge to deliver a decisive blow to the adversary.

Israel’s use of compromised pagers in the attack on Hezbollah also brings to light a new approach to employing EW for kinetic objectives. While not a conventional cyberattack, the operation highlights the potential of exploiting legacy communication systems for kinetic means. It underscores the role of HUMINT in modern warfare. It demonstrates how combining low-tech vulnerabilities with high-tech sabotage can effectively disrupt adversarial operations and lower the morale of rank and file.

The lesson for nations facing similar threats is clear: no system is beyond exploitation, no matter how secure and isolated it is conceived to be.

The author is an expert in defense communication strategies. He has a Master’s degree in communication systems from IIT Roorkee and a doctoral degree from IIT Indore. He is an Army veteran with 24 years of experience in designing, planning, and operating tactical and strategic defense communication networks in counter-insurgency and high-altitude warfare scenarios. He is presently heading a tech strategy vertical in the cellular industry.

By Lt Col Sidharth Shukla (Retd)

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